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ABSTRACT
Using a dataset of more than 80 accounts during 2015, this article
explores the gendered ways in which self-proclaiming Twitter Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) supporters construct community around
“suspension.” The article argues that suspension is an integral event in
the online lives of ISIS supporters, which is reproduced in online
identities. The highly gendered roles of ISIS males and females frame
responses to suspension, enforcing norms that beneﬁt the group: the
shaming of men into battle and policing of women into modesty. Both
male and female members of “Wilayat Twitter” regard online as a
frontline, with suspension an act of war against the “baqiya family.”
The ﬁndings have implications for broader repressive measures against
ISIS online.
ISIS, Gender and Twitter: A Research Gap
Since its emergence in 2013, so-called Islamic State (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS])
has established a reputation for its sophisticated use of a variety of media and social media
platforms from which to propagate violent jihad.1 Messaging applications such as Telegram
or WhatsApp, and social media including Facebook, YouTube, Ask.FM, and JustPaste.It,
among others, have been used to propagandize videos, and share photos, Portable Document
Format (PDF) ﬁles, Word documents, or blogs. As quickly as a new platform emerges, it has
been occupied by ISIS supporters, who frequently use one application to direct followers
onward to another. The result has been wide social media permeation by ISIS. As well as
generating online support, this has resulted in ofﬂine action, with active online ISIS fans
known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq, or to have carried out terrorist acts.2
Currently however, ISIS faces severe challenges to its activities, both on the ground,
where it is losing territory, and within this online space. The site where this impact has
been most evident is the online micro-blogging forum, Twitter, perhaps the most popular
of the ISIS social media platforms. Twitter became a key outlet for ISIS from 2013 to 2015.
In 2014, after the declaration of a Caliphate, Berger and Morgan estimated some 46,000–
CONTACT Elizabeth Pearson Elizabeth.1.Pearson@kcl.ac.uk PhD candidate War Studies, King’s College London,
Strand, London, WC2R 2LS.
Color versions of one or more of the ﬁgures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/uter.
© 2017 Elizabeth Pearson. Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1352280
90,000 active ISIS support accounts.3 These consisted of both “ofﬁcial” propaganda
accounts, as well as thousands of “unofﬁcial” accounts owned by sympathizers and sup-
porters across the world. Content was expressed in a variety of languages, originating
from, and aimed at, different global audiences.4 Twitter’s popularity was in part due to its
diverse functionality. Twitter enables users to adopt an anonymous online identity, which
can easily be customized to facilitate identiﬁcation by “like minds.” Account holders can
micro-blog messages up to 140 characters in length, in which media can be embedded.
Users may “follow” others, and be “followed” back. Twitter allows users to share content,
either by retweeting others’ messages or endorsing them through “likes” (previously
“favorites”). Accounts may be rendered visible to a select private audience or the public at
large, and using past online activity, Twitter suggests similar accounts of interest to follow.
With this complex functionality, Twitter therefore offered the potential for the transna-
tional growth of ISIS networks, for active recruitment, for the dissemination of content
including videos, images, and documents, and the ability to tailor messaging to different
audiences, private as well as public.5
As a result, open source social media and Twitter material have become a useful and much-
relied-on research resource.6 Twitter provides data-rich insights into the lives, preoccupations,
and beliefs of those posting. This is not to assume that all those professing allegiance to ISIS
online are what they appear; the recent case of Joshua Goldberg, who simultaneously repre-
sented himself online as jihadi, Nazi, and feminist activists shows that identity online can be
deceptive.7 Nor are there established links between online activity and ofﬂine violence, or
indeed ofﬂine activism. Few studies have assessed empirical data to understand the relation-
ship between virtual and ofﬂine extremism.8 However, those that do suggest the Internet does
not necessarily accelerate the process of “radicalization.” Von Behr et al. found online activity
was no substitute for in-person meetings;9 meanwhile, in a study of lone actor terrorism, Gill
et al. found the rise of the Internet did not correlate with a rise in lone actor terrorism.10 In a
further study of the online behaviors of 227 convicted U.K. terrorists, 96 percent of whom
were male, Gill et al. conclude that the vast numbers of online extremists do not progress to
terrorism.11 However, those who do commit terrorist acts “regularly engage in activities in
both [online and ofﬂine] domains.”12 Therefore there is no easy translation of Twitter—or any
other online—extremism to the ofﬂine environment. What research of Twitter has, however,
enabled, is the demonstration of the ways in which ISIS’s use of the forum are consistent with
the historical use of both media, and social media, by terrorist groups more broadly (propa-
ganda, recruitment, notiﬁcations, claims of attack, calls to attack).13 This study again makes
no claim to conclusions that will assist ofﬂine counterextremism methods; it instead offers
insights into the gendered effects online of a particular initiative within Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) tactics: suspension.
Given the success of the Internet in drawing both male jihadi ﬁghters and female jihadi
state-makers from across Europe, Asia, the Middle East and the Americas, Internet compa-
nies have an interest in understanding their own role as a facilitator in this process.14 Social
media providers also experience pressure from policymakers and police to act. In 2016 the
UK Home Affairs Select Committee suggested far more needed to be done by social media
companies to counter the “Wild West” that is the Internet.15 In May 2017, a subsequent
Home Affairs Select Committee report suggested social media providers were repeatedly fail-
ing to remove illegal content, even when alerted to its existence, and needed to take far
greater responsibility.16 Twitter’s policy is to prohibit abusive behavior and misuse by
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extremist groups or individuals promoting violence or hate.17 Aware of its growing coloniza-
tion by ISIS supporters, Twitter has also recently instigated a targeted policy, intensifying the
account-takedown or “suspension” of active ISIS supporters, employing more staff with this
remit, and instituting a series of technical programs to identify offending accounts.18 Since
2015, when this research was conducted, Twitter has aggressively pursued a suspension
strategy, reducing numbers by as many as 360,000 to August 2016.19 Since the instigation of
this policy, Twitter ISIS networks, recruitment, and funding have all been hit hard.20
As a “take-down” process, suspension constitutes a repressive rather than preventive
counterradicalization measure. It can remove accounts but cannot stop “returners,” who fre-
quently reestablish new accounts post-removal, known as the “whack-a-mole” effect.21
Despite frequent “return,” other social media platform providers have also favored “suspen-
sion” or “removal” policies, viewed by many as an effective means to limit the online expan-
sion of ISIS networks.22 Berger and Morgan support this approach in their ISIS Twitter
Census, the widest study to date of ISIS behavior on the forum.23 While noting the preva-
lence of return accounts, and an estimated 8 percent of account activity reportedly dedicated
to “account rebuilding,” Berger and Morgan deny this invalidates suspension as a policy.24
They liken the tactic to weeding: “The consequences of neglecting to weed a garden are obvi-
ous, even though weeds will always return.”25 Through interrupting online activity, and
requiring effort for ISIS supporters to ﬁnd networks and followers once more, account sus-
pension “wastes their time.”26 Berger, however, notes the possibility of unwanted side-out-
comes to suspension, such as further radicalization.
What has not been considered, however, is the way in which gender is present in
CVE tactics such as Twitter suspension of ISIS supporters. Gender is a key gap in
research on online extremism, as will be explored in the next section. Analysing gender
involves both an engagement with differences in the ways in which self-identifying men
and women behave online, the social expectations of that behavior, and any differences
in how tactics such as suspension impact on male and female supporters. As Sjoberg
asserts, “While sex categorisation is a part of gender analysis, gender is often described
as a social construct … constructed by a particular culture … because people agree to
behave as if it exists or to follow certain conventional rules.”27 Such rules govern the
Salaﬁ jihad, dictating male/female roles, behaviors, spaces of access and aspirations.28
The majority of violent actors may be men, but women are present as “extremists” in
large numbers online. In existing discussion of Twitter suspension, quantitative assess-
ments of impact have additionally been prioritised, with less research into the qualita-
tive effects on ISIS supporters as a group. This piece aims to address this gap, by
focusing on the gendered effects of counterextremism methods on Twitter, ﬁrst, because
they are under-explored, and yet reveal interesting dynamics in identity and networks
within online ISIS communities; second, as they have implications for similar restrictive
actions elsewhere on the Internet. ISIS has demonstrated the ability to repeatedly evolve,
and the lessons learned from ISIS support—and take-down—on Twitter, are important
for counterextremism across platforms. The analysis also focuses on the affective
impacts of suspension, and from the perspective of ISIS supporters, in order to reveal
this support group not simply in numerical terms, but as a community, and one that is
constructed around gender. The next sections will set out why gender and affect are sig-
niﬁcant for study of Twitter and suspension, before moving to the methodology and
ﬁndings themselves.
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Gender, Women, and ISIS Online
Studies on how gender factors in online radicalization are still in their infancy, and there are
calls for further research.29 Most of the work to date has focused on the role online of “ISIS
women.” This is due to the concerted involvement of women by ISIS in its Caliphate project,
which marks a key difference between ISIS activity and previous Islamist groups, including
Al Qaeda. The state-centric goals of ISIS, and the aim of creating a functioning polity within
a—besieged—territory, have necessitated the recruitment of women, who are desired within
this space as state-makers, home-builders, supporters, mothers, propagandists, and wives
for ﬁghters.30 While women from across the world have traveled to Syria and Iraq to live
within the Caliphate, 700 from Tunisia for example alone, many more women ISIS sup-
porters are highly active online, a long-seen trend in female Islamist activity.31 Al Qaeda,
for example, used propaganda magazines such as Inspire to promote women as core online
supporters. Their lack of public visibility was regarded as a key advantage to their ability
to covertly raise support, as well as funds.32 This is to some degree replicated in ISIS rela-
tions with women. In her large-N sample Twitter study, Klausen considered the actions of
female ISIS supporters online, and pointed to the “Umm factor”—a reference to the fre-
quently adopted honoriﬁc—which suggests women are key secondary disseminators of
extreme material.33
The relative prevalence of female Islamist engagement online is linked by a number of
authors to key differences between the operation of Salaﬁ-jihadist gender norms in the off-
line versus online space. Opportunities for public engagement in ofﬂine space are limited for
both Salaﬁ-jihadist women, and within some traditional Muslim cultures more broadly.
Women may face restricted movement and expression outside the home, and “free-mixing”
between sexes is not encouraged. Authors including Sageman suggest the online space is
therefore popular among female extremists as it operates as a comparative site of liberation,
free of the gender boundaries and restrictions frequently found ofﬂine, particularly regarding
the expression of female aggression. Consistent with this, Bermingham et al. point to the
intensity of extremist messaging by women online, the Internet allowing them greater free-
dom to demonstrate aggression when compared with men, in the absence of constraining
ofﬂine gender norms.34 Women’s engagement in jihadist interaction online may therefore
fulﬁll a “safety valve” function.35
Contrasts between online freedoms for women and ofﬂine restrictions are not trivial.
There is already some evidence that gender differences online are impacting on ofﬂine
behavior, with women for example more likely to be recruited to ISIS through online
approaches. Claudia Dantschke founded the German counselling program Hayat to help
those involved in radical Salaﬁst groups. She works with women and families in deradicaliza-
tion and associates an increased female “vulnerability” to ISIS recruitment online with wom-
en’s better-developed online social networks, and an ability to snowball recruit via online
friends.36 Other research notes that women are perhaps less likely to be recruited ofﬂine in
part due to the aforementioned cultural restrictions on physical freedoms and access to pub-
lic space.37 Gyms, mosques, and streets, examples of locations of male recruitment,38 are not
necessarily “spaces of vulnerability” for women. Indeed women exploit their presence online
to serve as far more than just supportive “fan-girls,”39 and have proved themselves active
recruiters of other women. Saltman and Smith’s analysis of 12 social media female jihadis
concluded they were committed to a recruitment role. These women were invested in the
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principles of violence, even if Salaﬁ-jihadist gender restrictions disbarred them from violence
itself.40
The importance of less restrictive gender norms in ofﬂine space, and the impacts on
female and male expression and behavior are so far, however, broadly absent from assess-
ment of CVE approaches online. It is long acknowledged that Muslim men have most often
been suspected of terrorism, and been subject to CVE programming or tactics such as the
United Kingdom’s Stop and Search policy in the ofﬂine space, with disproportionate impacts
on them.41 The prevalence of ISIS-supporting women online similarly suggests that CVE
measures in this virtual space may disproportionately affect them, or at least affect them in
particular ways. Indeed, to understand the online space in gendered terms and to recognize
the differences in male and female norms and behaviors raises important questions for any
repressive actions there. This article provides tentative answers to those questions, by consid-
ering gender differences in the impact of suspension.
Affect, Community, and the “Baqiya Effect”
Online studies of ISIS females online to date have focused on the roles taken, risks posed,
and activities carried out, in terms deﬁned by the frameworks of terrorism research (e.g.,
propagandist, media-spokesperson, recruiter). The meaning given to the online space by
ISIS activists, as constructed by them, has been neglected. Twitter ISIS supporters can, how-
ever, be considered part of a broader online “radical milieu,” supportive of the aims of ISIS,
and engaged in constant attempts to express this, despite user regulations on “terrorist”
groups and online abuse.42 Users themselves are aware of their creation of an online milieu,
and the particular group norms of the Salaﬁ-jihadist ideology. In particular, gender provides
a useful framework through which to consider the interactions of ISIS Twitter supporters, as
they themselves broadly segregate into communities of male and female users. These com-
munities do mix, forming shared networks; however, both men and women tweet caution
over too much “free-mixing” online, and many accounts suggest members of the opposite
sex should not “DM” (‘direct message’) them with private messages. Indeed, the demarcation
of particular roles for men and women, and gender segregation, is a feature of Salaﬁ-jihad-
ism, and gender has an evident function in group ideology as well as the practicalities of
recruitment, propaganda, and legitimate access to organizational violence.43
The sense of online community has also led many ISIS supporters to describe the Twitter
space as a “wilayat” or “province.” Members of this province are constructed as the “baqiya
family,” baqiya being a term colonized by ISIS and meaning “persistence”, or “endurance”.44
This term emerges in this research as a centrally unifying concept around which Twitter sup-
porters cohere in the face of adversity. Study of the affective nature of the relationships
within this “family” enables another reading of gender, beyond that of difference between
“women” and “men,” instead considering power and status rooted in particular conceptions
of masculinity. Affect can be understood as emotion created in interactions between people,
encounters producing self, identity, and also bodies.45 It can also be read as a “state” of being,
the effects of which are ampliﬁed when shared, for example, a contagious yawn.
Affective studies reconceptualize feeling as communal and shared, rather than experi-
enced by individuals alone.46 Communal feeling can be invoked by terrorist groups, who cre-
ate collective “moral shock,” through the dissemination of distressing images or narratives.47
Gender is evident in such messaging through association with status, status-lowering
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emotions—such as humiliation—associated with feminization/emasculation, and status-rais-
ing with masculinity.48 Additionally, non-conscious affective dimensions of emotion nourish
other conscious feelings, such as shame or humiliation, which can be explicitly instrumental-
ized to create radical identities, as in the context of the violent jihad.49 Affect is crucial to
understanding both ofﬂine and online space, where social networks are constructed around
emotion, intimacy, and affectual relationships.50 The naming of emotion can be instrumen-
tal in creating online communities of feeling.51 As Ahmed emphasizes, shared anger, pain,
grief, or love are inherently politicizing emotions ofﬂine and online, both “shared spaces of
dwelling.”52 For Ahmed there are two important consequences: the need to reconsider the
public manifestation of sentiment assumed to belong to the private sphere; and the contesta-
tion of the dichotomy, emotion versus rationality.53 In the online space the result can be the
creation of “tribes of shared emotions,” in which everyday encounters are key.54
Article Aims
This article incorporates the above insights to offer an analysis of the gendered and human
impact of suspension on Twitter communities, bridging a research gap. It considers the side-
effects of suspension and asks, what else is happening in online milieus when supporters are
removed en masse? What are the supporter perspectives on this action? Does it deter them,
or encourage? Additionally, given the ways in which Twitter ISIS communities self-segregate
according to gender, how do groups of men and of women respond to suspension? This arti-
cle aims to go some small way to address the research gap in gender and extremism, with an
exploration of the impact of suspension on a discrete sample of ISIS supporters on Twitter
through the month of July 2015 and a focus on gender and affect. It challenges the conceptu-
alization of suspension as an event outside the “core business” of Twitter ISIS supporters
online, presenting it instead as an integral feature of the online lives of ISIS sympathizers.
This is evidenced in the incorporation of suspension into online representations of identity,
avatars, and handles.
The article also challenges the terms in which impact and inﬂuence online should be con-
structed, suggesting the importance of “immeasurables” based on affect and emotion, such as
“community” and, in this sample, the “baqiya family.” This emphasis emerges from consider-
ation of the meaning of Twitter, as constructed by ISIS supporters themselves, and indepen-
dent of analyses seeking to categorize and delineate particular behaviors, according to existing
counterterrorism frameworks. First, it considers the activities observed in the gendered com-
munities evident online. Second, it focuses on the impacts of suspension, arguing that: sus-
pension bolsters a dominant recruitment narrative, that the mainstream persecutes Muslims
and the Ummah, enabling Twitter to be constructed as an extension of the ofﬂine battleﬁeld;
ritual practices and norms are in turn constructed around suspension, and suspension is a
Twitter life-event around which gendered community forms. It adds to growing studies
suggesting suspension is disruptive, but also constructive, when regarded from the perspective
of the group.55 It additionally understands the online space as one in which, as Kuntsman
suggests, “digital ‘structures of feeling’ work together. with broader political forces.”56
The analysis considers gender through differences in male and female behaviors, and
practices, representative of different values associated with men and women through the Sal-
aﬁ-jihadist ideology adhered to by ISIS. These gender values are malleable, subject to deﬁni-
tion according to culture, group purpose, and location.57 By using gender as a tool of
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analysis, this article builds on the work of many scholars who believe the consideration of
gender is integral to understanding militant groups.58 It also heeds a recent call by Conway
for research on online extremism to pay closer attention to gender, a somewhat under-
explored aspect of investigation.59 It considers the concept of baqiya as one uniting support-
ers of ISIS across social media platforms, suggesting that lessons learned from Twitter there-
fore have implications for future sites of ISIS activity. It recommends a gendered awareness
of the possible outcomes of suspension, given the different behaviors of self-identifying men
and women online. While Twitter suspension has clearly been very effective in removing
content and users, the article reﬂects on the potential impact of this removal on morale, and
community. As ISIS supporters are removed from Twitter, some may ﬁnd other social media
platforms to occupy, which must also confront the challenge of extremism. Additionally, the
ﬁndings may have implications for other ideological movements on Twitter and other social
media.60
Methodology
Twitter has served as perhaps the most researched site of ISIS activity, to the neglect of other
platforms.61 This article, however, explicitly sets out once again to engage with Twitter ISIS
support, and for three reasons. First, despite a relative focus on Twitter, there are still many
unanswered questions about extreme movements’ behavior there, particularly relating to
gender. Second, this work aimed to address a gap in analysis of scale. There have been few
small, random sample, qualitative analyses with line by line manual coding of entire life-
cycles of accounts, from ﬁrst to last tweet. Large-N studies, considering a vast quantity of
data, have analyzed discrete sets of tweets, and not entire life-cycles of a given account. For
example, Klausen considers only the last ten tweets of inﬂuential individuals in her 2015
study, Berger and Morgan only the last 200 in their census.62 Third, it focused on random
users, rather than those well known in the media, although “celebrity” characters were found
within the networks. Fourth, as the site on which ISIS supporters were most active, there are
lessons to learn from research on Twitter for other social media platforms perhaps absorbing
its users as a result of the suspension clamp-down.
It should be noted that one limitation of any social media research is that the chosen sam-
ple may not represent the wider population of interest as a whole. Indeed, Mislove et al. sug-
gest that Twitter users, when contrasted with the general population, tend to be
disproportionately male, white, and from densely populated geographic regions.63 While
this bias is obviously unlikely to straightforwardly apply to ISIS Twitter samples, the general
question of how to avoid sampling bias remains unresolved.64 Meanwhile, there are speciﬁc
issues for terrorism research, in which participants are criminalized, removed from social
media sites and their communities are hard to access, online and off. With that caveat, Twit-
ter nonetheless provides a rich resource for the understanding of social relations and identi-
ties, at the level of the populations constructing them.65 The results presented here therefore
suggest interesting and unexplored further paths for larger-scale research, as well as theoreti-
cal avenues for future study.
This research was undertaken throughout July 2015, with three data harvests carried out
over the one-month period: one at the outset, one midway through July, and one at the end.
To locate a cross-section of the ISIS-supporting milieu online an initial hashtag search was
undertaken to identify ﬁve seed accounts for each sex, from which other accounts could be
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harvested through snowball sampling. The hashtags used were those popular among ISIS
supporters on Twitter at the time. Some were gendered, such as #Teamhijabi, others were
not, such as #baqiya. Others were temporary, and hijacked other causes, such as #sevens-
even, the hashtag commemorating the Al Qaeda London Transport attacks of 7 July 2005,
also used by ISIS to call for further violence.
The ﬁnal data-set size aimed for was between 30–50 accounts for each of two categories:
self-identifying men and self-identifying women, the smallest usable size for a qualitative
study in which data was coded line by line by the researcher. Eventually 47 women were
included and 41 men. There is, however, no independent way in which to verify the sex of a
Twitter account-holder. Twitter users personalize proﬁles in a variety of ways, all of which
present a means to express gender. These include: the proﬁle names, handle (the “@” name
address), avatars (proﬁle picture), carousel (proﬁle backdrop picture) or user biography, a
short description.66 Some handles are “kunyas” or “noms de guerre” and those beginning
“Umm” or “Abu” are used to denote gender, ‘Umm’ being the Arabic for ‘mother’, and
‘Abu’ for ‘father’. Many are not. The self-identiﬁed sex of the user can also be determined
through examination of interactions between users, who greet one another in gendered ways
(e.g., “Akhi”, the Arabic for “my brother” and “Ukhti”, the Arabic for “my sister”). Addition-
ally, there is no independent way to verify account identity. As far as was possible this difﬁ-
culty was mitigated through the selection of accounts with a large network of followers,
some of whom could be veriﬁed through media reports, and frequent tweeting. This suggests
acceptance by other members of networks, who themselves are suspicious of accounts that
may be “spies,” police, journalists, or researchers. Where “men” and “women” are used in
the analysis, the phrase “self-identifying” should therefore be understood. The research also
excluded “bots” or automated tweet generators. These are relatively easy to identify through
the pay-for Twitter analysis site used, Twitonomy, in which their tweeting patterns emerge
as square, non-organic, patterns.
The main inclusion criteria were that accounts were active, public, and that support of
ISIS was the primary function of the account. “Support” was established in a number of
ways: tweet content, Avatar and Carousel images (ISIS ﬂags, the Black Standard, ISIS
symbols), locations including Mosul, Raqqa, Dowla Islamiya, Islamic State, or in Arabic,
. The research sought accounts with more than 100 followers. However,
after the ﬁrst harvest the latter criterion was relaxed, in order to include account-holders
reactivating after being suspended. Mass suspension frequently affected Twitter accounts
supporting ISIS at this time and this affected data, removing tweets, followers, and altering
the numbers of favorites and retweets of remaining accounts. Another important inclusion
criterion was that the account user should be predominantly tweeting in English. Many
English-dominant accounts also use small amounts of Arabic, or other European languages,
and retweet tweets in other languages.
The sample consisted of a diverse age range, apparently spread across a number of coun-
tries. Some users state their country of origin via names, or handles (e.g., “al Amriki”, the
American, or “al Britaniyah”); however, many are ambiguous, and given information may
not be accurate. Some claimed to be in Syria and Iraq (nine men and seven women); others
in Europe, Africa, Turkey, and the Americas. Tweets may contain the location of the user,
but only if Global Positioning System (GPS) facilities are turned on, which is rare among
ISIS supporters. Additionally, Twitonomy was used to provide the time-zone of accounts,
and main language tweeted in. Four or ﬁve seed accounts were located for each set, “men”
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and “women,” and their followers and following lists explored to identify a further set of
approximately 40 accounts per gender for analysis. The seed accounts, since expired, were
@Umm___Maryam, @saraEUK, and @Urwatulwuthqa_ AllahuMawlakum for women. The
men’s seed accounts were @The_Ansar_4_ISIS, @omarabdullah_00, @Salaﬁ_
Jihadist, @AbuHudayr03, and @BurrningOne. From here snowball sampling was engaged to
grow and include a variety of other accounts fulﬁlling the key inclusion criteria.
Exclusion criteria were also applied. The ﬁrst excluded category was intellectuals, radical
imams, and known preachers, such as Anjem Choudary or Mizanur Rahman, both United
Kingdom–based, both relatively well known to the media, public, and security services, and
both of whom have subsequently been convicted for terrorism offenses. They did not count
as “ordinary” community members, and their accounts, while containing tweets in support
of Sharia and ISIS, were not primarily aimed at support of this movement. The hashtags
also brought up a second category that needed to be excluded, Twitter-users following an
orthodox Salaﬁ Islam, without any evidence that they advocated violence or supported ISIS.
Analysis
This is a qualitative study, with some quantitative analysis relating to basic statistical proper-
ties of the sets of tweets, male and female, in order to measure inﬂuence alongside affect.
Twitonomy was used to produce Excel spreadsheets of content and basic quantitative infor-
mation on tweet patterns, and screenshots were taken of each avatar and carousel image.
These images were also coded. Quantitative information was gathered regarding the action
categories on Twitter: Tweeting, Retweeting, Mentioning, Replying, Favoriting (which has
since become “Liking,” now indicated by a small heart image, but previously a star), Tweeting
Hashtags, and Tweeting Links. Comprehensive analytics can be found in Table 1. The content
and tone of these tweets was analyzed and coded manually.
This article is the result of recognition of a signiﬁcant aspect of the study: the frequent
suspension of accounts in the dataset, and the affective ways in which that was differently
engaged by male and female ISIS supporters. It should be noted that the initial aim of this
research was to ﬁll a gap in the knowledge of female ISIS supporter behavior on Twitter,
compared with male. The focus on gender in suspension emerged through gradual aware-
ness of the ways in which suspension was impacting accounts. July 2015 saw several mass
suspensions by Twitter, partly due to the actions of anti-ISIS activists “Anonymous,” who
mass-reported accounts.67 This presented challenges for the maintenance of the dataset,
although it did not permanently deter the sample. In all, 16 of the 47 women in the dataset
were suspended during the study, and 12 of the 41 men, with women’s suspension rates
slightly higher per person on average (0.33 to the men’s 0.3). Some of the accounts initially
identiﬁed for the sample had also previously returned from suspension. Given the analysis
of full life-cycles of accounts, using the data provided by Twitonomy,68 suspension emerged
as an important part of content and this impacted the direction of the study.
An analysis was carried out on users’ tweet content, the aim of which was to consider the
impact of suspension on accounts. This was measured by assessing the number of tweets
dedicating to re-establishing accounts, the proportion of tweets dedicated to this task, and
how this was achieved, including the use of emoticons, for example: “@BxxxRxxx24 waiyyaki
ukhti..˘˘˘” The ﬁrst tweet back after suspension was also analyzed, to assess the tone, and
to record how frequently this was retweeted.
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Findings: Gendered Communities, Gendered Roles
Before addressing the speciﬁc gendered impact of suspension and the ways in which ISIS
communities of self-identifying males and females respond to this tactic, it is necessary to
explore the highly gendered nature of the research sample. This consisted of a broad inter-
connected community, with subdivisions evident along gendered lines. These gendered com-
munities encountered in this research visibly served the function of propagating ofﬂine ISIS
norms—relating for example to women’s dress, or men’s duties to engage in battle—in the
online space, with a high level of coherence between norms in the two domains. These
norms serve to keep the Islamic State functioning through the prescription of female domes-
tication alongside ideological commitment, and a male preoccupation with battle. Confor-
mity to such norms is needed to ensure the future of the state, and the online communities
therefore act in ways to ensure individuality is repressed. Male–female divisions in obliga-
tions are repeatedly emphasized. Women police one another into maintenance of ISIS
norms, and men encourage one another to battle. Each gendered community also acts to
shame and police the other sex, as well as their own, into their role. These insights are further
developed later in the paper, with consideration of the speciﬁc ways in which suspension
impacted on these communities.
Gendered Communities, Gendered Inﬂuence
Men and women emerged as enjoying different inﬂuence, and roles, using gendered commu-
nities in different ways, with different audiences, ﬁgures and reach, as shown in Figure 1.
Males had greater scores in a number of measured categories suggestive of greater online
“inﬂuence.” These are presented in the format (male:female), and all are median values.
They had more followers when contrasted with women (473:344); the ratio of followers/
following was higher (3.44:1.71); they have more user mentions (63:41) and more mentions
per tweet (0.44:0.28). The percentage of their tweets being retweeted was higher
(20.69:13.64), as was the total number of retweets (88:76.5), and the number of times any
given retweeted tweet is retweeted (3.78:2.88). The percentage of male tweets being favorited
was also higher (38.78:33.4), and each favorited tweet was favorited more than for women
(2.18:2). All this suggests men are the key Twitter inﬂuencers with their tweets more likely
to be disseminated, mentioned, and favorited. After suspension, it is common for users to
announce their return to Twitter with “returning” tweets. Male “I’m back” announcements
after suspension were retweeted a mean average of 24 times, versus women’s 16, while male
return announcements were favorited a mean average of eight times, and women’s seven.
Men seem to “count” more online, according to standard interpretations of inﬂuence.
To some degree a user cannot control which of their tweets others choose to retweet or
favorite. However, men clearly acted to promote their inﬂuence, for example, employing
greater use of hashtags, which give tweets greater reach and ensure they are retrievable to a
wider audience. Considering median values, they used hashtags eight times as much as
women (8:1), and three times as much when hashtags per tweet are examined (0.03:.01).
Men’s use of hashtags clearly weights their ability to be retweeted, to be mentioned, and to
gain followers in the way in which they appear to be doing. Men also tweet more links per
tweet, when the median score is considered (again, 0.03:0.01), which may also give their
tweets greater appeal.
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Women’s sense of community was by contrast more “insular,” demonstrated in their
higher scores in certain categories than men. Again, considering median averages, expressed
(Male:Female), they favorited more tweets than men (35:43.5), and a higher number of their
tweets were favorited (77:110.5). Additionally, they have a higher number of favorites per
100 followers (22.71:37.68). One explanation could be that women are followed predomi-
nantly by other women, although this could not be veriﬁed; another is that women appear to
prefer favoriting as a mode of tweet approval. Favoriting a tweet, while visible to the original
tweeter, who receives a notiﬁcation, is primarily a private act, shared between fewer people
than either retweeting a tweet or mentioning it in another tweet. Female approval-giving
therefore appears as a more private act, for their community only, than for men.69 This may
also indicate more personal relationships within female networks on Twitter.
Shaming Men, Policing Women
The gendered communities online are highly conformist, evident in the similar choices of
avatar and carousel images. Both men and women favored particular images, including
the ISIS ﬁghter, the ﬂag, ISIS slogans, religious slogans, and weaponry. Some avatar
images had speciﬁc gender associations. Men chose the ISIS ﬁghter as the most popular
image. However, there was less conformity around the men’s choice of avatar, with this
image appearing 19 times. Meanwhile, the most popular women’s image was the black
burqa-clad woman, which appeared 29 times as an avatar image. This is consistent with
ISIS dress codes for women in all their Wilayat, with obligatory black burqa, gloves, and
niqab. Women dressed in this way were associated with “true beauty” and contrasted
with— immoral—Western constructions of beauty, perceived as synonymous with vanity
and display of ﬂesh. One user, “RemoveYourFaceAvis,” committed her online presence
to pressuring others to ensure female online supporters did not post images of their
faces. She tweeted, for example, “We advice brothers [sic] to not RT UNCOVERED
women. 1) sin themselves by disobeying Allahs command to lower gaze2) let all their fol-
lowers sin.” This tweet was retweeted 27 times and favorited 12 times. Conformity
around established ISIS norms better enables activities such as the policing of ISIS
women supporters’ behavior, and regulation of male commitment to the physical task of
violent jihad. Female ISIS Twitter supporters spent time in engaging in enforcement of
Figure 1. Male and female inﬂuence: Median values.
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group conformity around dress, modesty, and the rules of interaction with men on
Twitter.
Men also policed women’s behavior, with enforcement of these norms frequently justiﬁed
in theological terms. For instance, one user tweeted “Two of the worst things to come across:
1. A sister without Haya 2. A brother without Ghırah.” Haya represents Islamic modesty
and Ghırah, a protective jealousy exercised by men, around “their” women. Haya requires
male Ghırah, and Ghırah requires the high valuation of women’s modesty and honor, in
order to have any meaning itself.
Men meanwhile also exerted pressure on each other. Their focus was, however, on the
honor of eventual martyrdom, and the necessity of violent jihad. This was the central focus
of male tweets, wherever in the world, as this user suggests, “Wallaahi I cannot wait for the
day that I meet all of my twitter bros, standing together in the front lines of battles.” Women
were expected to support this aim, even if it meant losing a husband. This male user tweeted,
“Our Women Don’t expect Us to Return Home with Roses in Hand, Rather Klash Hanging
from our shoulders, faces full of dust,body full of injury.” Women served to regulate this
through shaming. Umm Jxxxx retweeted this message for example, “15 years old teenagers
[sic] making hijra while 40 years old grown adult men shaking when the word ‘jihad is said
near them…’”
Relationship to State and Ofﬂine Gendered Roles
Such roles are crucial to the future of the Islamic State as formulated by its leader al Bagh-
dadi. Binary roles are enforced for both men and women, without which, the state, still bat-
tling for its survival, could not endure. The central aim of all ofﬁcial activities and norm
propagation is to ensure the future of the movement in Iraq and Syria. In this, men have a
clearly central aim as ﬁghters, and women as migrants, and state-builders, wives and moth-
ers. Women support violence, but only by men; only one woman in this sample was in favor
of active female participation in violence. Their attitude toward their own responsibilities
was consistent with ISIS norms set out in propaganda such as Dabiq, and centered on having
children as future ﬁghters, in lieu of participation in violence. Women frequently tweeted
about this, as in this tweet from Umm Jxxxx who writes, “I may not be able to join in jihad
and ﬁght but I can raise the next line of Mujahideen InshaAllah and I encourage sisters to
do the same.” Such sentiments were often accompanied by photographs depicting this next
line of ﬁghters, as shown in Figure 2. Relationships with men were also central to their online
Figure 2. The Next Generation.
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conversations, particularly through the use of images. Loving relationships were frequently
anthropomorphised, with images of lions or other animals used to depict affection between
male and female.
Communities were oriented toward three things: fantasies of a past Utopia, which they
were endeavoring to recreate; the much-cited hardships of the present struggle; and a future
life where Islam could be followed in the way they preferred, with strict adherence to Sharia.
The binary ofﬂine norms of Islamic State, in which men have predominantly warrior roles,
and women are monitored and policed, are clearly reproduced online, constructed as a vir-
tual “frontline.”
Findings: Suspension, Emotion, and Gender: Fear, Anger, and Resistance in
Wilayat Twitter
The previous section explored the ways in which gender is crucial to an understand-
ing of the sample of ISIS supporters: gender shapes their communities, behaviors, and
the relationship of Twitter ISIS followers to the norms of the ofﬂine Islamic State.
Suspension thus impacts not merely on ISIS supporters, but on sub-communities of
males and females. This highly gendered online landscape contextualizes the ﬁndings
presented in this section, which focuses on the key ﬁndings that the impact of sus-
pension is affective, generating an emotional response that is incorporated into the
online identities of the dataset, becoming a signiﬁcant event in their “Twitter lives.”
This was an event around which emotions of fear, anger, and outrage were con-
structed; this in turn fostered community and identity, and in gendered ways, with
clear differences between responses in self-identifying male and female account-hold-
ers. Most importantly, the communities that consistently promote the core ISIS phi-
losophy appeared to be strengthened by suspension, an act around which they
cohered, in gendered terms.
Gender and Suspension in the Creation of Online Identities
Identities are created and displayed online in a variety of ways. First, speciﬁc identities are
created through the biographies and handles of many of the accounts. As mentioned, Twitter
users may have an “@” address or handle, and a name, which can be changed during a Twit-
ter life. Users may also include a brief biography. Post-suspension, many users created both
biographies and handles that represented their resilience in the face of having “survived” sus-
pension. This was particularly true of the self-identifying men in the sample, of whom 27
percent directly referenced suspension in their Twitter proﬁle information. By contrast, only
17 percent of the sample’s women used proﬁle information to notify others of past
suspension.
The majority of the sample referred to Twitter’s use of suspension as a speciﬁc tool to per-
secute Muslims. For example, one user tweeted “RT @_xxx_4_ISIS: @xxx_2 Dear akhi, could
you please give me a shout out? There has been a major Twitter purge targeting Muslims.”
July 2015 also witnessed use of the hashtag “radicalized.” Comments implicating Twitter in
that process included, “I got #Radicalised when me and my people started to get suspended
on every social media platform.” Suspension permits Twitter ISIS supporters a speciﬁc ave-
nue for resistance, as seen in the biography of Umm Q (Figure 3). This spirit of resistance is
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also evident in the ﬁrst tweet of another female user, “They made their best to defeat us but
kuffar doesnt know they can’t let us our spirit down we came back,” which was accompanied
by violent emoticons, accentuating the emotional tone of the language used (Figure 4). Per-
ceived as an oppressive action, suspension is reproduced by ISIS followers according to a
subversive agenda, as seen for example in the handle of QxQx alBxxxxxxx, who humorously
names himself “@omgnotagain313”. Oppression, through suspension, is no longer an action
simply exerted by external forces on ISIS followers; it is reconstructed as part of a long his-
tory of “kuffar” aggression against Muslims, and incorporated into the identity of those
online, not weakening, but strengthening them. For example, Abu B and Abu D reference
past suspension in their image headers (Figure 5). The male approach to suspension is highly
masculinized according to hypermasculine criminalized norms, reconstructing Twitter dis-
ruption as the online equivalent to ofﬂine jail-time. Many men in the sample used biographi-
cal information to record the number of times that they had been suspended and returned.
The ability to “survive” and return from suspension demonstrated “baqiya”, the enduring
nature of the Islamic State. For those who had returned despite challenge from the “kuffar”,
the display of past suspension became a badge of honor, both celebrating those who made it
back and defying the intention of the practice.
While many men followed this pattern, others emphasized the difference between the
Twitter battle—online and therefore insigniﬁcant—and the “real” battle taking place in Syria
and Iraq—of high signiﬁcance. Indeed, an emphasis on place was apparent in the images
used to represent identities, with a number including images of desert, nature, or landmarks
of Shams to remind what and where the ﬁght was about. Some users in fact mocked male
accounts boasting of suspension return. Abu TLT for example scorned fellow Twitter users,
tweeting, “Whats up with this new trend of ‘Twitter Veteran’ in Bio, Get A Life Fellas.”
Figure 3. Biography Referencing Return From Suspension.
Figure 4. Violent Emoticons After Returning From Suspension.
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Identity is an important aspect of ISIS supporters’ online presence and one that the sam-
ple strove to maintain, despite suspension. The repeated use of favorite avatars, carousel
images, or speciﬁcally worded biographical information persisted throughout suspension
attempts. This had two functions: ﬁrst, it enabled other users to recognize returning friends;
second, it also served to emphasize the signiﬁcance of the continuity of visual aspects of
identity online. For example, €Umm ~amı^~na identiﬁed herself in her initial biography as a
“Scots lassie” living in Algeria. Her tweet rate was extremely high, in excess of 68,000 tweets.
She seemed to have escaped suspension due to her location outside Europe. However, in
July 2015 her account disappeared. When it reappeared a few days later, it was possible to
identify her, as a number of characteristics remained the same or were tonally similar. These
included: the same carousel image, a similar avatar image (light slogan in English on dark
background of images), similar stylistics for name and handle, including the use of redun-
dant accents, and a new name, which rhymed with her old (Figure 6).
Figure 5. Suspension Referenced in Online Identity.
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Gender and the Ritual of Twitter “Return”
Suspension is not simply evident in its incorporation into the visual identities of ISIS Twitter
supporters. Analysis of tweet content of whole life-cycles of accounts reveals its prominence
as a signiﬁcant Twitter “life event” and therefore as a conversation topic. Those returning
from suspension adhere to ritualistic formulae when re-establishing a Twitter presence with
a new account. This was repeated over and over in the sample, with 73 percent of the women
returners following this pattern, and 75 percent of men. The ritual is formalized in stages.
The ﬁrst stage is the announcement of the returnee that they are back. The second stage is
reliance on both “shout-out” accounts and other ISIS supporters to help them rebuild fol-
lowers. “Shout-out” accounts are those explicitly set up to enable returners to ﬁnd old net-
works, to let others know they are back, and to widely disperse news of suspensions and
returns. The third stage is one of back-and-forth in which shout-outs are retweeted, and
those assisting in this process are thanked.
Gendered differences in approach to this ritual were evident in the sample, primarily
through the different tone engaged by men and women to shout outs for help, and to thanks
for it. The central quality to this ritual among women is an affective display of warmth and
love for any other women helping them. While “brotherhood” characterizes male desire to
engage in the ISIS community, and indeed the radicalization mechanism as conceptualized
in Sageman’s “Bunch of Guys” model, the importance of the notion of sisterhood to ISIS
women has also been noted.70 This “Ukthi-hood” is distinguished through the proliﬁc use of
feminized emoticons, such as hearts and ﬂowers (Figure 7). This warmth and sense of built
community through affect and shared emotion is one ISIS Twitter supporters are conscious
of and strive to create, as one female user expresses through a retweet, “It’s when you’re sus-
pended that you feel the love and support from other Muslims on Twitter the most. I love
being suspended:) .”
The unity of community through ritual and conformity is expressed in instruction of new
members in the particular suspension rituals of the group. Female users, for example, tutor
new recruits to the use of Arabic language they may not be familiar with, such as “jazak
Allah” instead of the English “thank you.” Arabic phrases pepper even the accounts of users
Figure 6. Before and after suspension.
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who are clearly only ﬂuent in English. The quality of the returning tweets of male ISIS sup-
porters is less deliberately warm and emotional, with fewer emoticons. Many men instead
engaged in the “game” of suspension with humor, for example, “Wallah im loving it enrag-
ing the kuffar come join in loool I love shahdah so ready to get suspended.”
Suspension and Community: Male and Female Roles
Such differences—male sample members adopting an outwardly more blase stance toward
return after suspension, engaging humor, against the women’s more feminized discourse
within all-female groups—contributed to the construction of particular forms of online ISIS
community. The sample network consisted of both men and women. However, this could be
further subdivided into particular communities of males and communities of females, engag-
ing with one another in different ways, on different themes, one of which was suspension
itself. Women in the sample were more likely to be suspended in the month of study than
men. Tweets on the subject of suspension, or explicitly following suspension, constituted 24
percent of the output of those women who experienced suspension, and appeared to fulﬁll a
number of functions, including re-establishing one’s own account and others’ accounts; dis-
cussing the consequences, likelihood, and causes of suspensions; speculating as to the where-
abouts of other users post-suspension. The ﬁgure for those men who were suspended was 20
percent.
However, “suspension conversation” (retweets of others shout-outs, support tweets for
accounts, shout-outs for one’s own account and tweets in which content speculated on sus-
pension) was not limited to those who themselves experienced suspension. The topic
accounted for 16 percent of the total female tweets across the sample and 8.5 percent of the
male. Attempts to divine the logic of account suspension preoccupied ISIS supporters, and
what caused suspension was the source of much speculation. Some attributed it to time spent
online, as one female user tweeted, “Ahaan … I ain’t got suspend. … Weired [sic] My this
account lasts 1.5 month… lol.” Another theory expressed was that suspension related to
numbers of followers, as this female user in Libya speculated, “I worry when my followers
gets to 400 means my suspension is on the way.” Another male user tweeted, “Yes twitter i
know i have reached 900 followers no need to remind me munaﬁq i know u’r going to sus-
pend me today.”
If suspension is an event around which community builds, it is also one that tests the
boundaries of those communities, which are rigorously protected. Trust among followers is
hard to gain, and particularly after a mass suspension, credentials are frequently required to
ensure people have the identities they claim. This can be frustrating, as this tweet shows,
“RT @skxx45: This was prepared from me and now for those who again ask me photos and
doubt go & see that its me & not fake.” Suspicion among ISIS supporters on Twitter is high,
as a similar tweet from Abu H expresses: “The politics of twitter and everyone second guess-
ing if next person is legit or a fed is highly irritating. I miss the pre ban Twitter.”
Figure 7. Feminized Emoticons.
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Many sample users created back-up accounts as part of their armory in this battle, left
dormant until needed, but their addresses shared, so that followers would easily ﬁnd them.
For example, this male user “@Backup_109_109” tweets “… i have some special codes n
words with brother which make them identify real me.” Suspension enforces the sense of
in- and outgroup, the subterfuge surrounding return emphasizing the subversive nature of
the ISIS community online, versus everyone else. The re-establishing of accounts is a way of
enforcing boundaries between “us” and “them.” While tweets call for support for some
accounts, they also fulﬁll an important role in warning against others, in order to protect the
“baqiya family.” This was most prevalent in the female sample, which most visibly and pub-
licly policed itself, as is evident in the conversation below. A user replies to two fellow female
Twitter users who apparently warn her against accepting new followers too quickly:
A: Yes that’s true. I always block them. Also those who locked their acc and follow many tweeps.
Jazak Allah khair akhi for…
… Reminding us. Especially in the last days did kuffar a lot to cause problems
B: exactly ukhti. It’s a lot of work to block all and to ﬁnd out who’s a member or not but better
to be careful.
C: than having a troll among us. And especially the new sisters have to checked
… it’s better to block too many than too less and have problems after that. I’ve learned that I can
only trust
… our tweeps who belong to the fam for a while. All those new ones have to prove that they’re
not trolls
This sense of “tweeps who belong to the fam[ily]” was often reiterated. The perception of
“community as family” was prevalent, as another female user expressed, “People keep telling
me that twitter ISIS too important to me but that’s not true, I don’t care about twitter, I care
bout my baqiyah family.” The need to protect this family is not just desirable, but a duty.
LadyG tweets, “if they block u ten times, keep coming back a hundred times. We r here to
support each other bi’idhnillah.” This is further enforced by another female Twitter account
holder who tweets, “Follow and support our sister and fulﬁll your obligation to expand
baqiya family…” This “family” assumes even more importance to those whose blood fami-
lies have disowned them for their loyalty to ISIS, as one user tweets, “I might have lost my
family due to me following Islam but wallahi Allah blessed me with two families one ISIS
the baaqiyaah family and (1)… I have another family so Alhamdulillah all praise ISIS due to
Allah swt (2).”
Wilayat Twitter: Shared Perceptions of “Online as Frontline”
Resistance to suspension through its inclusion and appropriation into online identity fulﬁlls
a speciﬁc purpose for both male and female supporters, conﬁrming a sense of moral righ-
teousness in the brand of Salaﬁ Takﬁri Islam propagated by ISIS, and its broader battle.
Twitter and its suspension policy on the other hand represents the dominant authorities,
and the broader community of non-believers or “kuffar”, as this user highlighted on his
return: “New Account You know the drill. Make Allah happy and anger the kufar! Follow
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and spread” followed by, “… the kuffs are so desperate. Each time they suspend us they take
great sin upon themselves.”
The act of suspension also serves as a metaphor for the greater trials endured by the
Ummah, as perceived by ISIS supporters. For example, male user Abu H used his biography
to compare perceived persecution via Twitter suspension to the trials of the Prophet, writing,
“Muhammad [PBUH] was stopped from giving Dawah by the Quraysh today those upon the
haqq [truth] are also stopped banned or suspended. Anyone not stopped is preaching batil
[lies].”
Additionally, while much analysis points to the propagation by ISIS of the Islamic State as
a Utopia, in which the perfect Islamic lives can be lived according to Sharia law, and in a
land where Muslims of all colors and races are equal, both males and females in the sample
presented much evidence of another perspective: a committed but realistic portrayal of the
hardship of the path. The same endurance required to combat repeated suspension was
pointed to by many Twitter supporters as necessary in the ofﬂine environment, where only
the hardiest of ISIS supporters would prevail. This “baqiya” was repeatedly cited in relation
to the harsh reality of the Islamic State and the need for the “true Muslim” to keep faith and
endure, as this ﬁghter expresses, “Driven by d command 2 ﬁght, angered by d oppression of
Muslims n desirin 2 establish Allah’s shariah; we left the comfort of our homes. #ISIS.” As
with Twitter suspension, so with the real struggle. Only those with utter commitment and
devotion to Allah would remain with ISIS, “This path was never meant to be rosy. Don’t go
to jihad intending to live a life of comfort. There’ll be blood and fear but never give up:).”
Discussion and Conclusion
The key issue raised in this article is that an important—and neglected—aspect of sus-
pension is not around the numbers making it back, but about the function of returning,
as understood by returners themselves. This article suggested that suspension has a
number of affective impacts on Twitter supporters, generating both emotional meaning
and community, expressed in particular gendered ways. It does not suggest that suspen-
sion is ineffective in reducing numbers of supporters. This is clearly not the case.
Rather, it seeks to emphasize other less quantiﬁable ways in which suspension may
reinforce the feeling of shared purpose felt by those supporting ISIS online, whether on
Twitter or on other social media platforms. It argues for a reconsideration of how we
assess the impact of suspension or take-down methods on other sites, recommending a
shift toward the recognition of the power of affect, emotion, and online community, as
well as quantiﬁable inﬂuence, such as numbers of followers and networks. This repre-
sents a shift in thinking about the meaning and function of social media community,
with the emphasis away from the more rigid and behavioral categories of terrorism
studies (“recruitment,” “propagandizing,” etc.) and toward an emphasis centered on the
meaning that ISIS supporters create for themselves. Central to this is the recognition of
social media ISIS supporters as occupants of a highly gendered domain; this is how
Twitter ISIS supporters themselves construct the Twitter space. It is relevant however
not just for Twitter, but any domain colonized by Islamic State.
The analysis began by suggesting the ways in which gender is evident in ISIS online,
by outlining conceptions of suspension as an effective method of combating online
extremism, “wasting the time” of Twitter users, and by suggesting that the dynamics of
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Twitter ISIS fans indicate suspension may impact on their communities in gendered
ways. It then challenged the notion that suspension is purely disruptive to ISIS online,
ﬁrst by suggesting gendered communities on Twitter fulﬁll important roles that have
consequences in the ofﬂine space; second, by outlining differences in the behaviors of
men and women online, and their relative inﬂuence; third, by bringing these ideas
together to emphasize the affective and community-building effects of suspension. Sus-
pension effects must be viewed not simply in terms of network-disruption; the emo-
tional and gendered effects of suspension also require recognition. These may be
formative in radicalization processes, relating as they do to a sense of belonging, us/
them othering, and grievance, all assumed to be pivotal in the path to extremism.71
This piece contributes to what is known about the constantly changing world of online
ISIS support and the function of gender within that. Further research is required on
the costs to ISIS supporters, in terms of network, versus the beneﬁts, in terms of com-
munity-building, of online take-down as an approach; and how this sense of both
“baqiya” and community is ported to other social media platforms. While “baqiya” -or
endurance- is the watchword of Islamic State, there is no room for complacency in
counter-terrorism policy, when it comes to success either on- or off-line. What can be
learned from Twitter must be transposed to the wider online arena.
The piece also suggests the importance of thinking about counterextremism meas-
ures such as “take-down” in gendered ways. The impacts on self-identifying male and
female Twitter supporters of suspension are different. In the online context, “commu-
nity” is clearly not synonymous with “network.” It is a collective experience, with affec-
tive and highly gendered qualities, which cannot be measured in quantitative ways.
This is particularly important when gender differences in recruitment are considered.
Few cases of migration to Islamic State, whether of state-building women or ﬁghting
men, have challenged the theory that the Internet alone is “sufﬁcient” for radicalization.
However, there is emerging evidence of the power of the Internet to speciﬁcally radical-
ize young women online, given their sometimes lesser access to the ofﬂine public space,
where men and boys more easily make the contacts enabling travel to Islamic State. An
online sense of community can have an ofﬂine effect. If collective identity, gender and
community are important factors in understanding ofﬂine radicalization—and they
are—then these concepts must be regarded as equally important in the online environ-
ment too. It is a hope of this analysis that these considerations will be routine in fur-
ther research on radicalization online.
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